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Abstract 
The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998 resulted in the return of devolved 
government to Northern Ireland and, with it, a decision by the Executive and 
Assembly to conduct a radical review of public administration. As the review reaches 
its final stages this paper considers the likely outcomes. It argues that the parameters 
of the review will limit its impact and describes the reform proposals as structural 
changes or administrative rationalisation, devoid of a wider modernising approach to 
improving public services. The on/off nature of devolution could result in ‘one of the 
major tasks for devolved government’ (according to the Northern Ireland Executive) 
being implemented by Direct Rule ministers. 
 
Introduction 
The onset of the ‘troubles’ in the late 1960s and prorogation of Stormont (1972) 
heralded the last major administrative reforms in Northern Ireland which stripped 
local government of key functions and vested responsibilities in a central executive of 
six government departments. It was apposite that the momentous return of devolved 
government to Northern Ireland in 1999, following the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement, became a harbinger for radical reform. The (then) First Minister of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly announced that one of the major tasks facing the devolved 
Executive was public administration reform which he saw as central to the way in 
which public services are structured, organised and delivered in the future. This is the 
opportunity, he argued ‘to put in place a modern, accountable, effective system of 
public administration that can deliver a high quality set of public services to our 
citizens’ (Trimble, 2002:5). Devolution impelled an examination of the overall 
architecture of government. The creation of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a 
regional tier of government added to an already congested political landscape which 
now features: 3 MEPs, 18 MPs, 108 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) 
and 582 local councillors for a population of 1.7 million people. In addition, a 
complex mosaic of government departments, agencies, local authorities, non-
departmental public bodies, boards, trusts and quangos, prompted the criticism that 
Northern Ireland was both ‘over-governed’ and ‘over-administered’.  
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This paper attempts to do three things. First, we will describe the existing and 
fragmented system of public administration in Northern Ireland and proposals for its 
reform. Second, we will critically evaluate what is emerging as the most likely 
outcomes from the review of public administration. Finally, we will suggest the key 
factors influencing the current proposals for reform. We will argue that because the 
reform of public administration in Northern Ireland was conceived as part of a wider 
programme of political change, this has delimited its scope and, through the influence 
of elite actors, circumscribed its potential outcomes. We will also suggest that the key 
emphasis in the reforms is traditional restructuring or what Pollitt (1984) described as 
‘bureau-shuffling’ where attempts are being made to ‘tidy up’ a hugely disparate and 
fragmented public sector whose current architecture owes more to incremental 
political tinkering than the rational distribution of powers and functions. 
 
Background 
Wright (1994: 108) argued that since the early 1980s Western Europe appears to be 
‘caught in a frenzy of administrative reform activity’ as a result of convergent 
pressures to reshape the state. These included, reducing the size, resources and scope 
of the public sector; budgetary, planning and evaluation reforms; the need to improve 
public management; dismantling the traditions of the civil service (permanence, 
tenure); democratising the public sector (greater public consultation); more user-
friendly public services; reorganising administrative structures; and, transforming the 
culture of the public sector. He observed that significant differences remained in the 
nature, intensity, timing and pace of reforms which could be explained ‘in terms of 
the opportunities afforded by the politico-institutional and cultural environment in 
which they are pursued’ (Wright, 1994: 101). Wright categorised the various types of 
reform programmes as those introduced: as part of an ongoing process of internally 
induced modernisation; a reaction to specific political pressures; piecemeal, pragmatic 
and instrumental in nature; necessitated by the management of the above reform 
programmes; or, as part of a wider programme of political change. Since the origins 
of the review of public administration in Northern Ireland were rooted in the 
Programme for Government in which the Executive pledged from the outset ‘to lead 
the most accountable form of government in Northern Ireland’ (OFMDFM, 2002: 7), 
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this would suggest a reform programme linked directly to the outworkings of the 
Belfast Agreement in the form of devolved government. In short, the Belfast 
Agreement resulted in a devolved power-sharing Executive and regional Assembly 
which, in turn, prompted the need for a radical overhaul of governance arrangements.  
 
Rhodes (1997: 44) stressed that ‘administrative reform is always political’ and 
described how the Conservatives from 1979 onwards acted to cut back government 
spending and control the administrative machine. He noted six broad elements in their 
reform programme – introducing the minimalist state, reasserting political authority, 
extending regulation and audit, reforming the structure, reforming public 
management, and transforming the culture. The reform agenda has continued with 
Labour under the flag of ‘modernisation’. As Massey and Pyper (2005: 59) report, the 
Labour Government ‘has attempted to differentiate its approach from that of the 
previous Conservative governments, and effectively give its managerialism a softer, 
friendlier and more accommodating image’. Hence, they argue, there is a greater 
emphasis on constitutional and political reforms rather than mere market reforms.  
 
Toonen suggests that the empirical study of administrative reform as a process is best 
conceived of as somewhere on a continuum between ‘planned change’ on the one 
hand and ‘emerging strategy’ on the other. In many cases, he claims, reform is ‘often 
presented as the outcome of planned effort, politicised to some degree, and in intent 
and presentation certainly not incremental in nature’ (Toonen, 2003: 472). In reality, 
however, Toonen concludes that reform is often long term, less rationally designed, 
piecemeal and a cyclical process. The process is ‘full of inconsistencies, self-induced 
consequences and unexpected serendipities, which in the long run, may actually 
generate some decent results, next to the misses inherent to any experimental and 
learning process’ (Toonen, 2003: 473). What constitutes ‘decent results’ or even 
‘misses’ however, add to the idiosyncratic nature of administrative reform outcomes.  
 
In considering why the actuality of administrative reforms is so distinctive across 
states, Pollitt and Summa (1997) offer four possible factors. First, the economy is 
always likely to be a background factor of some importance – the need to restrain the 
rate of growth of public spending. Second, the nature of the political system offers a 
powerful explanation for differences in reforms. Centralised states with strong single 
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party governments could force through changes in administrative reforms. Third, the 
nature of the administrative system which often reflects the political system in which 
it is located is an important determinant of reform. A strong core executive can 
impose reform throughout the whole of the public administration system. Finally, 
party political doctrine is offered as having some influence, although a less neat 
explanation of the nature of administrative reforms. Pollitt and Summa conclude that 
the most convincing explanations of reform trajectories in their empirical observations 
of four countries (Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK) were not economic 
performance or party doctrines but, rather, the characteristics of the political and 
administrative systems already in place. ‘It was these system characteristics which 
most significantly influence what was possible in terms of scope, process and speed of 
reform’ (Pollitt and Summa, 1997: 15). 
 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000: 24-25) refine this explanatory approach further by 
devising a conceptual map ‘depicting the broad forces which have been at work in 
driving and restraining change’ – it synthesises the process of reform in many 
countries. Therein they suggest that interactions between background socio-economic 
influences, political pressures, and characteristics of the existing political and 
administrative systems are shaping influences in the reform process. At the centre of 
their model is the process of elite decision making where change is conceived and 
executed ‘top-down’ by executive politicians and/or senior civil servants. Whilst 
sympathetic to Pollitt and Bouckaert’s institutional approach, Bevir et al criticise the 
model on two grounds: ‘it does not unpack the idea of path dependency by describing 
how and why the system got to where it is today’ and does not fully explore ‘the role 
of individual agency as a cause of change – there is little of the beliefs and actions of 
elite actors’ (Bevir, Rhodes and Weller, 2003: 3). They argue for an ‘interpretive 
approach’ as a way of understanding public sector reform. This requires historical 
narratives of elite constructions of reforms or the reconstruction of ‘the beliefs of 
elites to unpack the ideas that inform the changing actions and practices of 
governance’ (Bevir et al, 2003: 15). Using this approach, Bevir et al (2003) analyse 
public sector reform and draw out a number of implications, two of which (at least) 
speak directly to administrative changes about to take place in Northern Ireland. First, 
‘there is no tool kit applicable within or across countries. Governance is constructed 
differently and continuously reconstructed so that there can be no one set of tools’ 
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(Bevir et al, 2003: 203). This is already evident in the Northern Ireland context where 
attempts to modernise local government, in line with reforms in Great Britain, have 
met with problems. Second, ‘reform is a continuous, political process in which the 
meaning of change is contested’ (Bevir et al, 2003: 204). Hence, politicians in 
Northern Ireland are already fixated with which reformed council areas they are likely 
to control and how a stronger local government tier will relate to a devolved 
Assembly, as opposed to whether these offer the ‘best’ mechanisms for delivering 
high quality public services. 
 
As Great Britain experienced wide ranging administrative reforms, Northern Ireland 
was pre-occupied with reaching a political settlement. Although the Northern Ireland 
Civil Service claims to have played its part in reform initiatives such as the Financial 
Management Initiative (1982), Improving Management in Government: the Next Steps 
(1988), Continuity and Change (1994), and Modernising Government (1999), it did so 
within the confines of Direct Rule from Westminster where administrative reform 
assumed a low priority and policies were simply ‘read-across’. The Belfast 
Agreement and devolution changed all of that. 
 
Public Administration in Northern Ireland 
The current system of public administration in Northern Ireland is anachronistic and, 
aside from repackaging six civil service departments into ten to accommodate 
devolution in 1999, has remained largely unchanged since 1973. At that time the civil 
rights movement demanded major reforms in local government to address unionist 
hegemony consolidated through gerrymandered electoral wards, restricted franchise 
and discriminatory housing practices (O’Dowd, Rolston and Tomlinson, 1980). 
Reforms came in the shape of the Macrory Report (1970) which divided services into 
regional (requiring large administrative units) and district (suitable for small areas) 
services. The Stormont Parliament was to take responsibility for regional services and 
district councils would administer district services. Macrory recommended the 
establishment of 26 borough or district councils and the setting up of appointed 
boards to decentralise the administration of centrally provided health and education 
services. The recommendations were subsequently passed into law under the Local 
Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972. Macrory’s proposals were however 
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overtaken by the abolition of Stormont in 1972 and the imposition of ‘direct rule’ 
from Westminster in the absence of a regional tier. What has emerged since then is a 
an emasculated form of local government with limited functional responsibilities, a 
plethora of boards, trusts, and non-departmental public bodies superimposed with 
civil service departments which have responsibility for public services ordinarily 
delivered by councils in the rest of the United Kingdom (see figure 1). Public 
administration in Northern Ireland has been described by its Comptroller and Auditor 
General as ‘disastrously fragmented’. Almost every body in Great Britain that carries 
out any function of government, he argued, ‘is duplicated on a tiny scale within 
Northern Ireland and that is an impediment to clarity and an enormous inefficiency’ 
(Dowdall, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
The structure of public administration and efforts to reform its institutions are 
inextricably linked to the various political and constitutional initiatives which 
emerged in Northern Ireland including, since 1999, the on/off attempts at devolved 
government (Knox & Carmichael, 2005). The public sector remained largely insulated 
from the wider UK modernising agenda but for the odd read-across reform such as 
‘Next Steps’ Agencies where, as an after-thought, the Northern Ireland Civil Service 
Northern Ireland Assembly 
Executive Committee Departmental Committees 
North/South Ministerial 
Council 
British-Irish Governmental 
Council 
Civic Forum 
British – Irish Council 
11 Government Departments 
18 Next Steps Agencies 53 Executive NDPBs 
11 Tribunals 21 Advisory NDPBs 
8 Cross Border Bodies 19 Health & Social Services Trusts 
26 Local Authorities Others: charities, housing assoc. etc 
Figure 1: Public Administration in Northern Ireland 
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was encouraged to follow the Home Civil Service (Knox & McHugh, 1990). To 
ensure public services remained outside the political (and the possibility of sectarian) 
sphere, more key functional responsibilities were vested in non-departmental public 
bodies (quangos) resulting in a patchwork of unaccountable organisations with 
responsibility for a large proportion of the public budget
2
 (see table 1 & figure 2).  
Table 1: Public Expenditure by Sector 2004-053 
 Staffing 
Costs 
Non Staffing 
Costs 
Total 
(£million) 
Agencies 326.2 638.6 964.9 
Non-Departmental Public 
Bodies 
121.6 222.1 343.7 
North-South Implementation 
Bodies 
2.9 19.2 22.0 
Education and Library Boards 979.5 335.1 1314.5 
Tribunals 2.4 1.0 3.3 
Health Trusts 1,292.1 804.6 2,096.8 
Core Departments 567.3 2,576.5 3,143.8 
Local Government Not available Not available 363.8 
Total Public Expenditure 3,288.1 4,600.9 8,252.7 
A series of direct rule ministers buttressed and expanded these structures piecemeal. 
Ministers could dispense largesse by placing benign appointees least likely to cause 
controversy (‘yes [wo]men’) on quangos. Add to this an active and engaged voluntary 
and community sector which had service delivery capacity and confidence as a key 
stakeholder, and we have the administrative landscape that is Northern Ireland. Not 
only is the system overtly complex, but it also suffers from a significant lack of public 
accountability. Health trusts, education and library boards, and quangos, for example, 
consume some 45% of the public budget. There is no political representation on 
health trusts, education and library boards have up to 40% of their membership local 
councillors, and quango appointees are in the gift of ministers. The most democratic 
                                                 
2
 The expenditure shown relates to ‘transferred’ public services under devolved government 
arrangements. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland remains responsible for ‘excepted’ and 
‘reserved’ matters. Excepted matters are those matters of concern to the United Kingdom as a whole 
where no local variation is possible, such as defence, foreign policy and taxation. Reserved matters are 
powers that have not been transferred to the devolved Assembly but which could be at a later stage, 
such as policing and criminal justice. 
3
 Source of figures: Parliamentary Question from Jeffrey Donaldson MP to Ian Pearson: PQ3149/04 
26
th
 October 2004. These statistics, however, must be treated with caution. For example, the total non-
departmental public spending shown here is £343.7. Yet the budget for the Northern Ireland Housing 
Executive, a key quango, is £545m. Moreover, what are described here as education and library boards 
and health trusts can also be categorised as non-departmental public bodies. 
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forum, local government, is responsible for a meagre 4% of the public budget. With 
devolution came the opportunity for wholesale reform of a public administration 
system which, over time, had become ineffective and unaccountable. As Lord 
Glentoran (2004: 65) argued in a debate in the House of Lords: ‘I believe that the 
Government is now guilty to a considerable extent of maladministration in terms of 
waste of public money in many different areas. Northern Ireland is grossly over-
administered’. 
 
Figure 2: Public Expenditure by Sector 2004-05
Agencies
12%
Quangos
4%
Education
16%
Health Trusts
25%
Core Departments
39%
Local 
Government
4%
 
Specific value-for-money concerns have been raised by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General for Northern Ireland who concluded that seven of the seventeen Northern 
Ireland accounts could not be given a clear audit opinion, but had to be qualified in 
some way (Northern Ireland Audit Office, 2004). As one MP noted ‘the quality of 
government services in Northern Ireland too often lets down the people who are using 
them and who are paying for them through their taxes’ (Lidington, 2004: 9). This 
paints the picture of a public administration system ripe for reform which has now 
become a government priority. Under budget policies and priorities in Northern 
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Ireland for the period 2005-08 ‘better public services’ is highlighted as a target area 
(Department of Finance and Personnel, 2004a). The key priorities are health, 
education and transport, and continuing investment in public service infrastructure. 
The focus of activity in these areas includes reducing hospital waiting lists, reform of 
post-primary education, and the enhancement of water, roads and transport 
infrastructure. The review of public administration and civil service reform is seen as 
a key mechanism for attaining ‘better public services’. The latter will involve a 
reduction in the number of civil servants by some 2,300 (from 32,000 staff), a more 
professional, better-trained service, and one which is more representative of wider 
society (Carmichael, 2002; Carmichael and Osborne, 2003; Department of Finance 
and Personnel, 2004b). It is, however, to the detail of the review of public 
administration that we turn our attention. 
The Review of Public Administration 
The review of public administration commenced in June 2002 and published its first 
consultation document in October 2003. A team of civil servants in the Office of the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister is leading the review supported by a panel of 
independent experts. The original timetable envisaged an interim report in Spring 
2003 and final recommendations by the end of that year. With the suspension of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly (for the fourth time) in October 2002 and reintroduction 
of direct rule for Westminster, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his 
ministers have taken over responsibility for the review.  
Although attracting widespread political support and seen as a necessary component 
in delivering the benefits of devolution, two aspects of the review attracted criticism 
at the outset. In the first instance the 11 civil service departments were excluded from 
remit of the review on the grounds that this could be used to renegotiate the Belfast 
Agreement ‘by the back door’ since the power sharing executive was predicated on 
the four main political parties holding ministerial portfolios (Wilson, 2001). Any 
proposals by opponents of the Agreement to dismantle government departments under 
the review of public administration could therefore have wider political consequences 
for a power sharing executive. The second criticism was on the review mechanisms. 
The fact that civil servants were to lead the review did not satisfy the need for 
independence. As one MLA put it in a debate in the Assembly: 
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 Members (MLAs) know that in-house officials and the Executive’s sub-
committee will drive the review. The Executive will get advice and direction 
on some issues from the independent persons who, of course, will not attend 
full-time. However, the officials have a vested interest in keeping their 
administrative empires going, because who has ever heard of a civil servant 
who was anxious to reduce the number beneath him [sic] in the pyramid? 
(McCartney, 2002: 75). 
 
He predicted, perhaps prophetically, that cutbacks would be made in both the number 
and functions of the 26 district councils and this would divert attention away from the 
Assembly where 108 members would continue to exist alongside 11 government 
departments and the ‘huge burden of administrative costs’ involved. 
The review covers over 140 organisations within the public sector: 18 government 
agencies; 26 district councils; and 99 public bodies on which 2,065 public appointees 
sit (OFMDFM, 2004a). The focus of the work is ‘on the major public services which 
have most impact on citizens, and the organisations which deliver them’ (OFMDFM, 
2003: 8). This seems at odds with the exclusion of 11 core civil service departments 
with responsibility for some 40% of public spending. In seeking to ‘establish the 
optimum arrangements for public administration in Northern Ireland’ the terms of 
reference of the review required any proposals to satisfy the following characteristics: 
democratic accountability; community responsiveness and partnership working; 
cross-community concerns; equality and human rights; subsidiary; quality of service; 
co-ordination and integration of services; scope of the public sector; efficiency and 
effectiveness; and innovation and business organisation (OFMDFM, 2003: 13).  
The first consultation document set out 5 ‘high level’ models of public administration: 
1. Status Quo: No change to the current overall structure of public 
administration. 
2. Centralised: All major public services would be delivered directly by 
government departments. 
3. Regional and sub-regional public bodies: Public services would be delivered 
by a range of public bodies operating either regionally or sub regionally. 
4. Reformed status quo with enhanced local government: The retention of the 
main features of the existing system but with local government given new 
responsibilities. 
5. Strong local government: Major public services would be the responsibility of 
a smaller number of new councils. 
(Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 2003: 25-29) 
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The consultation period closed in February 2004 and 174 responses were received. 
The key messages from respondents were: 
 There was almost unanimous support for the need for change and a 
widespread demand for early action. 
 Quality of public services was seen as the most important characteristic 
against which any new system should be measured. 
 There was widespread consensus on the need for fewer public bodies, with 
more collaboration and less fragmentation. 
 Of the five high-level models, there was a preference for either enhanced 
or strong local government, with fewer quangos (Pearson, 2004a). 
The review team used the feedback from the first consultation paper to engage with 
local political parties in the absence of a return to the Northern Ireland Assembly.  
Northern Ireland Office Minister, Ian Pearson, pre-empted the launch of a second 
consultation paper by announcing his own views on the final reform model: 
 I envisage the Assembly with departments sitting at regional level with 
responsibility for policy, strategic planning, setting standards and monitoring 
performance. At local level, larger more powerful councils could have 
responsibilities for an increased range of functions… I will also be examining 
the scope for significant reductions in the number of public bodies, in 
particular, the administrative structures around health and education (Pearson, 
2004b: 1). 
Minister Pearson called for the formation of between 5 to 8 local councils to replace 
the existing 26 local authorities. The political backlash came swiftly. Local 
councillors viewed this proposal as an attack on local democracy and a portent that 
further consultation would be a facade. Minister Pearson sought a compromise and 
assured local politicians that his mind was not yet made up. 
The review team published a final consultation document The Review of Public 
Administration in Northern Ireland in March 2005 (OFMDFM, 2005a) in which the 
Direct Rule Minister heralds the proposals as a ‘further important step in creating a 
modern, citizen-centred, high quality system of public administration’ where 
‘improving the quality of public services lies at the heart of any new model’ (Pearson, 
2005a: 1). The final consultation based reforms on a two tier model of public 
administration. The first tier would be a regional tier encompassing the Assembly, 
government departments, and regional authorities, the focus of which would be policy 
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development, setting standards and delivering regional services. The second tier, a 
sub-regional tier, would encompass organisations that ideally operate within common 
boundaries to include councils, health bodies, sub-regional bodies and delivery units 
of regional bodies. The model assumed delivery at the sub-regional tier unless 
economies of scale (or other factors) dictated delivery on a regional basis (see figure 
3). 
In terms of specific sectors, three options were proposed for local government based 
on configurations of 7, 11 and 15 councils. These options were as a direct result of 
political compromise between the minister and political parties. The minister and the 
review team favour seven councils as ‘optimal for service delivery purposes’. This 
would result in local councils with populations of between 165, 000 and 390,000. The 
seven council ‘solution’ would allow for common boundaries with regional/sub-
regional services. The 15 council option originated from local politicians as a reaction 
to what they perceived as the minister’s attempt to radically cut the number of district 
councils. This option was based on the current 18 Westminster constituencies (with 
Belfast reduced from 4 constituencies to 1). 
In the health sector, the review team recommends the replacement of the four existing 
health and social services boards and 18 of the 19 Trusts (the Ambulance Trust would 
remain) with either five or seven sub-regional health agencies. The reviewers favour 
five agencies which would allow for a full range of health services (including acute 
hospital services), but to benefit from co-terminous boundaries, if seven councils were 
agreed, they would move to seven health agencies. In addition, the existing six 
regional health bodies
4
 would be reduced to four, and a regional forum established to 
advise on the development of regional services and the work of agencies. The current 
four health and social services councils that represent the views of consumers would 
be replaced by one regional body. 
 
                                                 
4
 The main regional service delivery bodies include: the Central Services Agency; the Health 
Promotion Agency; the Blood Transfusion Agency; the Medical Physics Agency; the Guardian Ad 
Litem Agency; and the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service. 
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In education, the Department of Education would continue to be responsible for the 
development and implementation of education policy and strategy, monitoring 
standards and allocation of resources. The functions in support of education 
(recruitment, employment and payment of teachers, school library service, transport, 
admissions,  raising standards) would be brought together in a new education services 
REGIONAL 
Devolved Institutions 
Departments 
Regional Authorities 
Executive Agencies 
Policy Development 
Strategic Planning 
Standards 
Delivery of Regional Services 
SUB REGIONAL 
Coterminous Boundaries: 
Councils 
Health Bodies 
Other Sub-Regional Bodies 
Sub-Regional Delivery Units 
 
Limited Policy Role 
Service Delivery 
Council Community Planning 
Civic Leadership 
Local representation, 
consultation and partnership 
 
 
Voluntary and 
Community 
Sectors 
 
 
Private Sector 
 
Central/Local 
Government 
liaison 
arrangements 
TWO-TIER MODEL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Figure 3: Source Review of Public Administration  
(OFMDFM, 2005a: 22) 
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body replacing the five existing education and library boards, Council for Catholic 
Maintained Schools, Comhairle na Gaelscolaiochta (Irish medium schools body), 
Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education and the Education Staff 
Commission. A second new education body would be formed to bring together 
existing professional support services (curriculum development, examinations and 
assessment, in-service training, procurement of support services).  
 
The review team also considered quangos and executive agencies. In terms of 
quangos, two options are on offer. The first is that non-departmental public bodies 
should be abolished and their functions transferred to central or local government, the 
voluntary and community sectors or the private sector. The second option, favoured 
by the reviewers, is that public bodies should continue to exist but every effort should 
be made to improve their accountability. This would involve a review of all quangos, 
a reduction in their number and increased accountability arrangements. In terms of 
executive agencies, the reviewers concluded that in the absence of strong views 
expressed on their future, decisions should be left to a returning Executive and 
Assembly.  
 
Evaluating the Review 
A number of observations are possible on the review of public administration thus far. 
It is clear that the approach adopted by the reviewers, despite claims that 
improvements to service quality remain central to its outcome, is fundamentally 
structural. It is also clear that the civil servant reviewers are highly sensitive to local 
political reactions to their proposals, hence the major backtracking on initial plans for 
reducing councils to a optimal model of 7 local authorities. Assertions that the 
reviewers ‘envisage local government as the bedrock of a reformed and streamlined 
system of public administration’ ring hollow when their proposals for new councils 
amount to little more than tinkering at the margins in the form of limited 
additional/enhanced powers. The key thrust of their work so far is to reduce the 
number of public organisations to agreed common boundaries, not in itself a 
guarantee of service improvement, but for them a quantifiable measure of ‘success’.  
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This can be seen most clearly in their efforts to resist the replacement of a unitary (but 
relatively powerless) system of local government with a two-tier alternative. Local 
politicians vehemently objected to the loss of local identity in the move to a 7 council 
model. The response from the reviewers came in the form of a sop - ‘civic councils’ 
whose role would be ‘to consult locally, feed views into the main councils, and 
undertake assigned responsibilities on their behalf’ (OFMDFM, 2005a: 40). These 
smack of talking shops without even a budget for service delivery.  Civil servants on 
the review team underestimated the affinity with, or involvement in, local government 
by political parties with whom they have consulted (in the absence of the Assembly). 
The reviewers’ argument that what local government lacks in additional functional 
responsibilities will somehow be compensated by a proposed role for councils in 
community planning, is equally unconvincing. If, as suggested, councils sit at the 
heart of a community planning model with health, policing, housing, and education 
providers, their functional insignificance vis-à-vis other public sector stakeholders 
must make their role of leading local service planning problematic, if not impossible. 
Local politicians are, however, pressing for legislative powers to hold partners 
accountable for commitments they sign up to in the community plan. 
 
Consideration of the options for 7, 11 or 15 councils was informed by the rather 
crude, if easily determined, political profile of existing parliamentary boundaries read-
across to a reorganised local government. The territorial political calculus has, it 
seems, been a much more significant determinant than public service considerations. 
This could serve to reinforce existing voting habits in local government which 
currently reflect tribal politics and ignore councils’ performance in the delivery of 
public services. Although in opting for certainty in the number of reorganised 
councils which political parties could control, there were consequences for the future 
functions of local government. The consultation document pointed out: 
 In their discussions with the review team, the political parties acknowledged 
the need to strike a balance between maintaining strong local identity and 
councils operating at a size and scale enough to facilitate the efficient and 
effective delivery of an enhanced range of services (OFMDFM, 2005a: 25). 
In short, the larger the number of councils, the less likelihood of them securing major 
functions. What is on offer by the review team is hailed as ‘strong local government’. 
In reality, it is still a rather emasculated tier whose expenditure in delivering the 
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proposed new functions (see table 2) will amount to no more than 10% of the public 
purse
5
.  
Table 2: Proposed New Local Government Functions  
(Source: OFMDFM, 2005a: 30) 
 Planning 
 Conservation of natural and built 
heritage 
 Local economic development 
 Tourism 
 Urban and rural regeneration 
 Rural development 
 Future European programmes 
 Environmental services 
 Applications of building 
regulations 
 Community planning 
 Environmental health 
 Leisure and recreation 
 Arts and culture 
 Community development 
 Community relations 
 Emergency planning 
 Other services carried out in 
partnership with or on behalf of 
other bodies 
 Maintenance of the public realm6 
 
 
What is also disappointing are the review’s suggestions on quangos and government 
agencies. Having waited some 3 years for the outcomes of the consultation processes, 
it seems inadequate to suggest that there should be yet another review of quangos. If 
one considers the emphasis placed on local government reorganisation in the review 
of public administration and the almost cursory examination of quangos, and even 
less attention to executive agencies, this reinforces the view (compounded by media 
reporting) that it has become a review of local government. Considering also that one 
such quango, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, has an annual budget of £545m 
(about one and half times the budget of all 26 local councils), the case is conclusive. 
The review excludes central government departments (by design), and is skewed 
towards local government and away from government agencies, an exercise in 
producer capture by civil servant reviewers. The fact that no government department 
or executive agency even responded to the first consultation document supports the 
notion that they did not see the review as relevant to their raison d’être.  This is all the 
more surprising when their record of delivering public services is examined. If 
                                                 
5
 The Chief Operating Officer (or most senior civil servant) of the Review Team, Greg McConnell, 
claims that local government expenditure under the new councils could equate to £800m, 
approximately twice the size of the existing budget and around 10% of the public purse. 
6
 The RPA consultation document refers to ‘public realm’ aspects of roads as functions which include: 
the provision and maintenance of street lighting, management of off-street car parks, grass cutting and 
weed spraying, maintenance of amenity areas, gully emptying, pedestrian zone permits, permitting 
local events to be held on roads and salting of footways.  
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improving quality of public services lies at the heart of the review, those outside its 
remit, and those within which are receiving least attention, have a clear case to answer 
on these grounds alone.  
 
Evidence on the performance of quangos and executive agencies is far from 
impressive. The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (the largest quango outside of 
health and education boards and trusts) and its parent department (Department for 
Social Development) were severely criticised by the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC) for their failure to get to grips over a long period with the homelessness 
problem. The PAC report noted that planning for the provision of homelessness was 
inadequate and the Housing Executive took 14 years to develop its first formal 
homelessness strategy. This, the PAC concluded, ‘shows a disturbing degree of 
complacency about meeting its statutory duty towards some of the most vulnerable 
members of society’ (PAC, 2004a: 1). Two of the largest education quangos, the 
Belfast and South Eastern Education and Library Boards, were the subject of a 
statutory inquiry set up by NIO Minister Barry Gardiner as a result of a substantial 
overspend in 2003-04 (£11.4m and £21.4m respectively). The report uncovered 
serious failings in the execution of responsibilities within both boards. Their chief 
executives were found to be in ‘very serious breach’ of their responsibilities and, as a 
result, their accounting officer status was put on probationary basis until June 2006 
(Department of Education: Jack Report, 2005). One political party’s education 
spokesperson said of the report: ‘it is so damning that the public will rightly question 
why more money should be made available to quangos (a reference to education 
boards’ calls for increased resources) which can’t manage the money they already 
have’ (Wilson, 2005: 1).  
 
A similar picture emerges in considering executive agencies. The two largest 
agencies, the Roads Service and the Water Service, both in the Department for 
Regional Development were lambasted by the Public Accounts Committee for 
‘disgracefully high’ levels of sickness absence costing over £2m per year in direct 
costs. The Accounting Officer could give no explanation for the widespread failure to 
apply procedures and had not considered the possibility of a wider systemic malaise 
in other areas of management. The report was stinging in its conclusions: 
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 We find it totally unacceptable that taxpayers should be expected to fund the 
disgraceful level of absence which has allowed to build up in the Roads and 
Water Services. We are also very critical of management who failed to 
implement their own procedures and did little or nothing to address the 
problem until it became the subject of a report to Parliament (PAC, 2004b: 41) 
The two executive agencies in the Department for Social Development, the Social 
Security and Child Support Agency, were similarly indicted. The Comptroller and 
Auditor General for Northern Ireland (C&AG) was unable to form an opinion on the 
financial statement of the department for two consecutive years (2001 - 03). The 
Social Security Agency had estimated losses of £121 million in Income Support, 
Jobseekers Allowance, Disability Living Allowance and Housing Benefit as a result 
of errors by officials and customers, and fraudulent benefits claims.  These services 
have been qualified by auditors and reported on for a number of years. The C&AG 
similarly qualified his opinion on the Northern Ireland Child Support Agency for the 
ninth consecutive year due to overpayments of maintenance by non-resident parents, 
and inaccurate assessments of maintenance which led to significant errors in amounts 
owed to non-resident parents (Northern Ireland Audit Office, 2004). 
What these examples highlight is that the organisations which the review of public 
administration has paid least attention to, have been those most severely criticised for 
the management and stewardship of public funds. As one member of the Public 
Accounts Committee put it: ‘every time we examine anything in Northern Ireland, it 
always seems to be shockingly lax’ (Davidson, 2004: Q35). The review of public 
administration may well be seen as part of a wider policy agenda in Northern Ireland 
for ‘better public services’ as outlined in the Government’s priorities and budget 
2005-08, but a structural reconfiguration of institutions with a partial focus will not, 
of itself, improve services to the public, its professed aim. In a debate in the Northern 
Ireland Grand Committee, one MP made this point more succinctly: ‘it is not only the 
review of public administration that is relevant when we are talking about the quality 
of services. The way in which government in Northern Ireland is supervised and 
managed can affect the quality that the end-user receives’ (Lidington: 2004: 10). 
Northern Ireland also appears to have eschewed the modernising public services 
agenda in the rest of the United Kingdom (Modernising Government, 1999; Principles 
into Practice, 2002; Leading from the Front, 2003; Putting People at the Heart of 
Public Services, 2004). The Northern Ireland Civil Service instead argues for ‘a 
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reform agenda appropriate to the Northern Ireland context’ comprising: specific 
sectoral reforms (on acute hospitals, post-primary education, public transport); joined-
up delivery (in welfare reform, neighbourhood renewal, investing in health); 
responsive government; structural changes (review of public administration); funding 
and financing public services (water and rating reform); and improving public sector 
capability (civil service training/reform) (Department of Finance and Personnel, 
2004b). Yet none of these initiatives appear to be integrated. The review of public 
administration is a structural reform being conducted in isolation from ongoing 
sectoral reforms. 
  
All the Northern Ireland political parties broadly welcomed the review (the United 
Kingdom Unionist Party, notwithstanding), albeit perhaps for different motives. 
Whilst all accepted the need to streamline cumbersome administrative arrangements, 
create more accountable structures and remove the democratic deficit, the DUP, in 
particular, saw it as an opportunity to reduce the number of government departments 
and hence the size of the power-sharing Executive. With devolution in cold storage, 
political parties engage in bilaterals with Lord Rooker (RPA Minister of State) on the 
outcomes of the review. These meetings have tended to focus on the likely number of 
local councils to emerge. So far there has been little agreement on this as individual 
councillors exert pressure on their parties to back (different) options which will 
preserve their local authorities. Pressure is building however across political parties 
against decisions on such wholesale reforms being taken by an ‘outsider’ (Direct Rule 
Minister). Thus far, this has created no greater momentum towards the restoration of 
devolution. IRA evidence that violence has ended and guns have been destroyed 
easily eclipse administrative reform priorities. 
 
Bureau-Shuffling? 
What are the likely outcomes of the ongoing review of public administration, how are 
these being shaped, and will they result in higher quality public services?  Returning 
to the work of Pollitt & Bouckaert (2000) and Bevir at al (2003) proves useful in 
structuring our response to this question. The three key influences on the outcomes of 
the review could be described as: socio-economic context; existing political and 
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administrative systems; and the role of elite decision makers. We consider each in 
turn. 
 
(a) Socio-economic context  
The recent performance of the Northern Ireland economy has been favourable. It has 
grown at the same rate as the UK economy in 2004 (real GDP growth of 3%) and is 
predicted to grow faster than the rest of the UK in 2005 (3% and 2.6% respectively). 
The Northern Ireland labour market is performing well even though manufacturing 
employment has continued a downward trend. The unemployment rate (at April 2005) 
is 4.8% (equal to the UK) although its economic activity rate was the lowest of all UK 
regions (72.1% in NI, and 78.8% in the UK) (Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Investment, 2005a). One of the problems however is that the public sector is much 
more important compared to the rest of the United Kingdom. The Northern Ireland 
public sector accounts for almost a third of employee jobs compared to 20% in the 
UK. One of the key challenges for Northern Ireland therefore is to reform the public 
sector and, at the same time, to grow the private sector. The Government’s aim is to 
achieve this in two ways: a reformed public sector in better proportion to the size of 
the private sector by allocating resources that are central to creating the conditions for 
economic success; and, greater public private partnerships (PPPs) for the delivery of 
high quality public services and facilities (Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Investment, 2005b). The scale of this task cannot be underestimated both 
economically and politically. The public/private sector pay differentials are 
significant, attracting higher skilled employees into the former (Barnett and 
Hutchinson, 1998). As a result, cutting public sector jobs would prove politically 
unpopular. Despite problems with comparisons, research shows that Northern Ireland 
per capita public expenditure is ‘well above’ the UK average but equally, based on 
regional GDP per capita, is one of its poorest regions (Heald, 2003: 23 & 86). The 
devolved administration, in the absence of tax-varying powers has two main sources 
of income: a block grant from Westminster (determined by the Barnett formula) and 
proceeds from the regional rate. This means that the devolved Assembly is ‘operating 
in the context of zero-sum budgetary politics – making decisions about how a fixed 
budget is allocated between competing policy priorities’ (Barnett, 2001: 150).   
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‘Squaring the circle’ of a block grant and the need to improve public services has led 
direct rule ministers to introduce controversial proposals for water charges and a 
review of the domestic rating system. In terms of the former, the Water Service 
(Executive Agency) is to become a government owned company from April 2006. 
This, according to the Direct Rule Minister, will ensure an increased and sustainable 
level of investment in water and sewerage infrastructure without compromising other 
vital public services. Household water charges will be introduced based on a standard 
charge to contribute to the cost of maintaining connections to the water and sewerage 
systems, and a variable charge based on the property’s capital value. The rating 
system is also being reformed from one based on current rental value to an assessment 
based on the discrete (rather than banded) capital value of every residential property. 
This will be introduced from April 2007. Local politicians attacked the plans as a 
stealth tax designed to pave the way for a huge increase in local taxation. One on 
them described it as householders facing a ‘triple whammy’ of water charges, rates 
rises, and a requirement to pay for private finance projects (Weir, 2004: 1). The 
Minister, on the other hand, argued: 
 The upside is that water charges will release resources for services such as 
health and education. The downside is that unless water charges are brought 
in, the Northern Ireland budget will, within a few years, be around £500 
million less per year than would otherwise be the case. That would have 
profoundly negative impacts on public services in the region. And that is the 
real choice that has to be made, by Government, the political parties and the 
people of Northern Ireland (Pearson, 2005b: 2). 
 
The demand for public expenditure and improvement in services is more acute 
because of the high levels of segregation in Northern Ireland. Statistics from the 
Northern Ireland Housing Executive, for example, show that 70% of housing estates 
are more than 90% Catholic or Protestant; around 95% of children still attend 
separated schools; and, violence at interface communities continues to affect lives, 
property, business and public services (Office of the First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister, 2005b). This highly segregated society is costly in both social terms and 
public sector resources with duplication of facilities needed (schools, leisure centres, 
youth provision), all additional costs in a range of public programmes. At the same 
time there is a higher level of consensual poverty (defined as households lacking three 
or more basic necessities) in Northern Ireland compared to Great Britain and 
households in the bottom 30% of income distribution are made up of lone parents and 
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people with disabilities (Department of Finance and Personnel, 2004a). This places a 
greater burden on public services. 
 
Given this socio-economic context, a key priority for Northern Ireland is to secure 
better value for money from devolved expenditure. As Heald argued: 
An urgent priority must be rationalisation of the machinery of government, the 
complexity of which suggests a use of quangos to legitimise Direct Rule… 
With devolved government restored, there would seem to be potential savings 
to be secured from simplification and delayering. This is rendered more urgent 
by the additional number of ministerial departments created when the 
Executive was established. A systematic effort to streamline and simplify will 
be required (Heald, 2003: 87). 
 
This becomes more pressing as the generous levels of structural funding from Europe 
reduces significantly, notwithstanding an extension to the Peace II programme for 
Northern Ireland and the border regions of Ireland aimed at reinforcing progress 
towards a peaceful and stable society and the promotion of reconciliation.  
 
(b) Existing political and administrative systems 
The political context within which any of the proposed reforms will take place 
remains highly unstable. The central assumption of the review is that ‘the new model 
of public administration will operate within the context of a return to devolution’ 
(OFMDFM, 2005a: 27). The results of both the local government elections and 
Westminster elections of 2005 make this prospect unlikely in the short-term
7
. With 
significant gains in representation for the DUP and Sinn Féin, the formation of a 
power-sharing Executive, a core component of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, 
seems a distant prospect. Direct rule ministers, on the other hand, have shown a 
willingness to push ahead with policy reforms, some controversial, on their watch. 
The abolition of the transfer test (or the 11+), introduction of variable fees in higher 
education, reconfiguration of acute primary and community care services across 
Northern Ireland, reform of the current planning system, and a comprehensive 
                                                 
7
 In the 2005 Westminster elections Sinn Féin secured 5 seats, an additional MP on the previous term, 
with 24.3% of the vote, an increase of 2.6%. The Democratic Unionist Party won 9 seats, four 
additional MPs on their previous representation in Parliament, with 33.7% of the vote, an increase of 
11.2%. 
In the 2005 local government elections Sinn Féin now has 126 council seats (out of 582 councillors 
Northern Ireland wide) and the DUP has 182 seats. This represents 23.2% and 29.6% of the votes 
respectively. 
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neighbourhood renewal strategy, are but a few of the major policy issues which 
British ministers are taking forward. Whether the proposals coming out the review of 
public administration, given its importance for any future devolved government, will 
follow suit is unclear. Direct rule ministers have been keeping local parties informed 
of developments but equally have appeared to afford their views little weight, 
dismissing claims that proposals for large councils would adversely impact on local 
identity. The fact that 69 of the 108 MLAs are also local councillors (with a dual 
mandate) means that any outcomes of the review which are seen to negatively affect 
local government could unravel, should its recommendations need Assembly 
approval. 
 
Within the existing political and administrative context, devolution matters, in terms 
of how people in Northern Ireland perceive the delivery of public services. A public 
attitudes (probability) survey of 1,800 people
8
 posed two questions by way of 
comparison: 
 
 With devolution, many areas of government in Northern Ireland came under 
the control of the Assembly. Can you tell us whether you think education, 
health and the economy, respectively, got better under the last Assembly, got 
worse, or stayed the same? 
 After the suspension of the last Assembly, can you tell us whether you think 
education, health and the economy, respectively, got better, worse, or stayed 
the same? 
 
The results (see appendix 1) show a significant improvement in education and the 
economy and no change in health provision under devolved government. The fact that 
Northern Ireland has the longest waiting lists in the UK even though it enjoys a higher 
per capita spend on health than England, may well explain the latter. But the public 
perceive services improving under devolved arrangements. This can be understood in 
part by their access to local ministers as opposed to absentee direct rule ministers 
some of whom spend less than one-third of their time in Northern Ireland, direct 
political accountability of MLAs for local decisions, and more media prominence 
given to debates within the Assembly.  In short, public administration reforms 
approved by a devolved administration and implemented under the stewardship of 
                                                 
8
 The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (2003) involved 1,800 face-to-face interviews from 
randomly selected respondents throughout Northern Ireland. 
 
 25 
MLAs are likely to impact more positively on public services than an arms-length 
programme signed-off by a British Minister. 
 
(c)   The role of elite decision makers 
The role played by senior civil servants is critical to the outcomes of the reform 
process. The reviewers are a multi-disciplinary team of civil servants assisted by a 
team of selected independent experts, although the former has primacy. From 1972 – 
99 senior civil servants in Northern Ireland enjoyed a privileged status with limited 
oversight from direct rule ministers. So pre-occupied were ministers with 
constitutional and security matters that senior civil servants had unfettered power, 
large public budgets and limited democratic accountability – appearance before the 
Westminster PAC was fraught but infrequent. Devolution changed this. In a report 
complied from interviews with senior civil servants on how they should respond to 
devolution, the authors noted: 
 Devolution has created a very different political arena. Local ministers are 
much more accessible to their own constituents and the NI public in general. It 
is therefore crucial that they are fully informed about the day-to-day business 
of their departments. Civil servants need to be sensitive to this and understand 
the importance of engaging with ministers on potential issues of public interest 
at an early stage… The public profile of civil servants is also more prominent 
particularly as the degree of scrutiny from Assembly committees, and in 
particular the Public Accounts Committee, is now more intense (Northern 
Ireland Civil Service: 2001, 24-25). 
 
The on-off nature of devolution
9
 has not however allowed this change of culture to 
become embedded. Hence, senior civil servants have both by the design – government 
departments excluded from the review of public administration, and by default – lack 
of response to the consultation document, distanced themselves from any possible 
changes or have regulated the process. It is, for example, an open secret that the 
Department of Education wrote the content of the education proposals contained in 
the review of public administration final consultation document. Despite the inclusion 
of independent experts as a consultation forum for civil servants reviewers, they 
appear to regard their senior peers (permanent secretaries of departments) as more 
important to mollify than external stakeholders. Or as one MLA put it in a debate in 
                                                 
9
 Devolved government in Northern Ireland is currently suspended (at the time of writing, May 2005) 
since October 2002. There have been four periods of devolution since the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement: 2
nd
 December 1999 – 11th February 2000; 30th May 2000 – 10th August 2001; 12th August 
2001 – 21st September 2001; and, 23rd September 2001 – 14th October 2002. 
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the Assembly on establishing the review: ‘if we allow the Office of the First Minister 
and Deputy First Minister to conduct this review, we will not get the result that people 
who sent us here demand and deserve’ (Close, 2002: 15). Prophetic words perhaps.  
 
Conclusions 
The professed aim of the review of public administration is, according to the Minister, 
improving the quality of public services. Northern Ireland, however, has adopted what 
Pollitt and Summa (1997) refer to as traditional restructuring or bureau shuffling. Of 
itself, this will not lead to an improvement in the quality of public services. The aim 
of the review team appears to be a significant reduction in the number of public 
bodies and creating common boundaries – a kind of selective administrative 
rationalisation which excludes core elements of the executive such as government 
departments, executive agencies and quangos (at least at present). Undoubtedly, there 
is a wider public service reform agenda to include a fundamental review of the civil 
service aimed at a reduction in 15% of officials by 2007/08 and several sectoral 
reform initiatives in health, planning, agriculture, education and economic 
development (OFMDFM, 2004b). These, however, are disjointed reforms with little, 
if any, similarity to the modernising public services agenda in the rest of the United 
Kingdom. This comparison, in itself, may not be important since as Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2000: 18) remind us ‘reforms in any particular country will almost 
certainly be shaped by the local preoccupations and priorities of the politicians and 
private actors most concerned’ and that these local frames of reference are likely to 
vary considerably. The socio-economic, political and administrative context of 
Northern Ireland and the role played by elite actors undoubtedly influence what is 
currently emerging within the reform agenda. 
 
The expectations of the review of public administration are enormous. Without 
question the structure of public administration in Northern Ireland will benefit from 
this rationalisation process, if only in helping the public to manoeuvre their way 
around the public sector maze. The review of public administration estimates potential 
savings of between £150 - £235m resulting from the changes and argues that these 
resources will be redirected into front-line services (OFMDFM, 2005a: 119). 
Conveniently, this allows for limited transparency in the outcomes of the review 
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(savings are absorbed) and hence the most obvious expression of its ‘success’ is 
reducing the number of public bodies. Given the high visibility of local authorities, 
they have become an easy ‘target’ and one which the media latch on to as an example 
of radical reform in language such as ‘axing councils’. What is on offer, however, 
under the guise of comprehensive reform and strong local government, amounts to 
little more than tinkering at the margins – bureau shuffling writ large. 
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Public Services:  
Direct Rule and Devolution 
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Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Test
10
: Education 
 
  N Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Test Stats
d 
Direct Rule Education 
– Devolved Education 
Direct Rule 
Education –  
Devolved 
Education 
Negative 
ranks 
386
a 
294.34 113616.00 Z -7.860
e 
 Positive 
Ranks 
194
b 
282.86 54874.00 Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000 
 Ties 893
c 
    
 Total 1473     
 
a. Direct rule education < devolved education 
b. Direct rule education > devolved education 
c. Devolved education = direct rule education 
d. Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
e. Based on negative ranks  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This test takes account of the size of the differences between two sets of related scores by ranking 
them and then summing those with the same sign. If there are no differences between the two samples, 
then the number of positive signs should be similar to that of the negative ones. The tables present the 
mean rank and sum of ranks for the negative and positive ranks, the number of cases on which these 
are based, together with number of tied ranks, the test statistic Z, and its significance level. 
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 Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Test: Health 
 
  N Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Test Stats
d 
Direct Rule Health – 
Devolved Health 
Direct Rule 
Health –  
Devolved 
Health 
Negative 
ranks 
283
a 
304.41 86148.00 Z -.114
e 
 Positive 
Ranks 
305
b 
285.30 87018.00 Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.910 
 Ties 986
c 
    
 Total 1574     
 
a. Direct rule health < devolved health 
b. Direct rule health > devolved health 
c. Devolved health = direct rule health 
d. Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
e. Based on negative ranks  
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Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Test: The Economy 
 
  N Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Test Stats
d 
Direct Rule Economy 
– Devolved Economy 
Direct Rule 
Economy –  
Devolved 
Economy 
Negative 
ranks 
370
a 
279.24 103317.00 Z -9.764
e 
 Positive 
Ranks 
162
b 
237.41 38461.00 Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000 
 Ties 998
c 
    
 Total 1530     
 
a. Direct rule economy < devolved economy 
b. Direct rule economy > devolved economy 
c. Devolved economy = direct rule economy 
d. Wilcoxon signed ranks test 
e. Based on negative ranks  
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